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Abstract 
The present paper examines the financial development of Belarus, with special 
emphasis on 1996-2002, when the financial sector was restrained by pervasive 
government controls. Belarus is of particular interest, as, despite no economic 
restructuring, annual growth has averaged seven per cent since 1997. It has been 
argued that monetary stimulation of investment activity through interest rate ceilings, 
directed credit and preferential loans revived growth. This article investigates whether 
a repressive financial policy, adopted by the authorities in the late 1990s, led to 
financial deepening and increased the share of savings allocated to investment.  
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Introduction 
It is widely argued that liberalising the financial sector by abolishing interest rate 
ceilings, refraining from directed credit programmes and removing capital controls 
will lead to financial deepening, and as a consequence to economic growth (see, for 
example, Shaw, 1973 and Fry, 1995). In the late seventies and early eighties many 
developing countries embarked on economic liberalisation, including financial 
sectors. Later, the International Monetary Fund and World Bank advised transition 
economies to adopt financial liberalisation to ensure a successful transition to a 
market economy.  
  Financial Liberalisation Theory has ignited much controversy. In most less-
developed and transition economies financial crises occurred at the start of a 
Financial Liberalisation (FL) policy (see, for example, McKinnon, 1993 and Weller, 
2001). This suggests that FL had detrimental effects on economic development and 
argues for the gradual withdrawal of the state from economic activity, until the 
necessary institutions are established and the development process is mainly free 
from the influence of the rent-seeking groups or political lobbies.  
The presence of information asymmetries in transition economies can lead to 
market inefficiency, and even failure. This particularly concerns financial markets 
that are, according to Stiglitz (1994), clearly distinct from other markets. The 
presence of information imperfections often triggers the problems of adverse 
selection and moral hazard that together inhibit market functioning. Stiglitz (1994: 
39-42) also contends that government intervention and financial repression can 
generally improve the efficiency of capital allocation through lowering the cost of 
capital and providing directed credits to enterprises with high technological potential. 
Many economists disagree. In particular, Fry (1997:761) noted that ‘market failure 
does not necessarily imply government success.’ He also argued that lower interest 
rates will not necessarily lead to greater capital efficiency because with directed 
credits firms with lower return projects are more likely to get loans.  
The question of government intervention versus free markets is of especial 
interest in the context of transition experience. The success of Hungary, the Czech 
Republic, Poland and the Baltic countries tempts many to recognise the triumph of 
the orthodox approach. At the same time some less successful episodes of FL in the 
majority of former Soviet Union republics raise the question of whether, given the 
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circumstances of those economies, FL could lead to financial deepening and 
economic prosperity.  
The present paper analyses the effects of financial restraints on financial 
development and growth in Belarus. Section 1 introduces the theoretical framework 
which is drawn from the two main strands of the literature – the McKinnon and Shaw 
paradigm (1973), and the literature on market imperfections. Section 2 provides a 
detailed analysis of Belarusian financial policy-making 1990-2002, to see if its 
policies and controls constitute financial repression according to its classical 
definition. Section 3 evaluates the impact of financial restraints on financial 
deepening, and on the pattern of Belarusian growth in the late 1990s. Section 4 
concludes.   
 
1. Financial repression: theory and evidence  
The term financial repression (FR) was first introduced by McKinnon (1973) and 
Shaw (1973). Following them, FR is a set of government policies and controls on the 
financial sector. These primarily involve interest rate ceilings; requirements for banks 
to hold government bonds or finance government budget deficits; directed credit 
schemes to support ‘selective’ industries; high reserve requirements; and 
administratively regulated foreign exchange rates; all of which restrain financial 
intermediaries’ activities. FR policies are accompanied by capital controls to prevent 
both savers and borrowers accessing foreign markets. The distortions from financial 
repression, particularly interest rate ceilings, discourage saving, and in reducing the 
average productivity of capital through the replacement of high-yielding with low-
return investments, reduces growth. Thus, raising interest rates to equilibrium levels 
and freeing foreign exchange rates, reducing reserve requirements, eliminating 
priority lending, or in general, introducing Financial Liberalization (FL), were 
regarded as the tenets of a growth-enhancing policy. The latter gave rise to the 
conventional transition approach, advocated by the IMF and the World Bank, for 
economies whose financial systems, inherited from a planned economy, were 
regarded as inefficient and restrictive.  
A second strand of literature addresses market imperfections in transition 
economies. Information asymmetries and uncertainty rendered many of their 
emerging financial markets inefficient and unstable. Thus government intervention 
was proposed to address market failures. Furthermore, the optimal extent of financial 
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repression was advocated to raise growth through improving the efficiency of capital 
allocation (Stiglitz, 1994). 
Financial repression has been widely studied in developing counties, which 
sometimes pursue strategies resulting in ‘shallow finance’ (Shaw, 1973).1 Most 
researchers conclude that FR damages financial development and consequently 
growth. However, in their FR studies of India and South Korea, Dematriades and 
Luintel (1997, 2001) conclude that different degrees of repression as well as cross-
country institutional differences can lead to contrasting results - causing financial 
disintermediation in India, but raising growth in South Korea.   
High growth in Belarus coincided with the financial repression pursued from 
the late 1990s. Is Belarus another successful FR case like South Korea? Or is it a 
negative case like India? These questions are addressed in the following sections.    
   
2. An Overview of financial development in Belarus: 1990-2002 
There are three distinguishable periods: 
• 1991-1993 - a ‘Preserving the status quo’ policy as a substitute for 
reform. Neither the Belarusian authorities, represented by the remnants of the 
Communist elite, nor society was ready for a radical political and economic 
transformation. Voters were keen to preserve the status quo, including a single 
Rouble zone and an assured supply of oil and gas at subsidised internal Russian 
prices. This helped Belarus avoid the early transition decline in production that was 
typical of the region, but it did not prevent a recession in 1993-1994.  
• 1994-1995 – Fragmentary market reforms. These involved some 
liberalisation of the domestic financial market: positive real interest rates; the 
allocation of about 80 per cent of short-term loans through market credit auctions in 
the Interbank Exchange Stock; tightened monetary expansion; and reduced reserve 
requirements. These measures plus a fixed exchange rate ( to anchor stabilisation 
policy) helped reduce inflation from 2,221 per cent in 1994 to 53 per cent in 1996, 
consequently restoring the credibility in the Belarusian rouble and providing the 
preconditions for an increase in the share of household deposits in total deposits 
(Korosteleva, 2004). 
• 1996-2002 – Pervasive state control introduced to preserve the 
Belarusian economic model. Fearing a collapse in his popularity because of 
declining living standards, President Alexander Lukashenko reversed the reforms in 
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1996--2002 and introduced elements of the repressed economy (ibid.). Thus 
administrative reallocation of resources and administrative interest rate control were 
supposed to keep state-owned enterprises afloat and boost output through stimulating 
aggregate demand. Timely wage payments, bans on layoffs and periodic increases in 
nominal wages were to target the social sector and, therefore, to reassure 
Lukashenko’s electoral support. Finally, the creation of rent-seeking mechanisms 
through licensing of certain economic activities, such as rationing access to cheap 
natural resources, introducing foreign exchange restrictions and a multiple exchange 
rates policy, were aimed at satisfying the interests of the political elite. Repression of 
the financial sector was placed at the centre of this policy, to make financial 
intermediaries serve government needs.  
 
2.1 Banking Sector  
In 1996 the practice of channelling lax credits to support loss-making enterprises was 
re-established through regaining state control over a banking system that had by that 
time been partly liberalised (Korosteleva 2004). State control was achieved through 
re-nationalising the banking sector, and legitimising the subordination of the National 
Bank of Belarus (NBB) to the government. 
 Re-nationalisation began in August 1995 with the merging of the state-owned 
National Savings Bank and the commercial Belarusbank. This turned Belarusbank 
into the state agent for channelling soft loans to the production sector.  
 Further re-nationalisation proceeded from Presidential decree No.209 of May 
24th, 1996 ‘On measures on the Regulation of the Banking Sector of the Republic of 
Belarus’. This listed the banks servicing the state’s programmes. Moreover it 
enumerated the measures to increase the government’s share and the share of state-
owned enterprises in the statutory funds of the banks. Finally it required bank clerks` 
wages to be paid according to the tariff system for the public sector. 
 On October 2nd, 1996 the Council of Ministers issued Resolution No.647/9 
that officially defined six large banks as the state’s agents in servicing priority state 
socio-economic projects and government debt.  Afterwards they were termed 
‘system-forming banks’ (hereafter, SF banks). This term primarily refers to their key 
importance for the economy. They control over 90 per cent of total assets, 90 per cent 
of enterprise lending, almost 100 per cent of lending to households, and their capital 
accounts for 77 per cent of total banking capital (Korosteleva, 2004). Thus the 
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banking sector in Belarus is a highly concentrated state monopoly.2 As of January 
2001, non-state ownership in banking was just 12 per cent, down from 45 per cent3 in 
1995.  
For the National Bank, edicts in 1998 and 2000 gave the State President the 
authority to appoint and remove the chairperson and Board of Directors of the NBB 
and to suspend and revoke any of its decisions (ibid.). Thus, monetary authorities 
were left with little room for manoeuvre in formulating and implementing their 
policies.  
Financial intermediation is shallow. Domestic banking credit was equivalent 
to only 21 per cent of GDP in 2003, far below many other CEE countries (see figure 
1). A loose monetary-credit policy, aimed at keeping the real sector afloat, drained 
banks’ financial resources because many loans were never repaid and inflation eroded 
the real value of bank deposits and capital, thus leading to serious liquidity problems 
and undercapitalization (Korosteleva 2007). Priority financing of loss-making state-
owned enterprises triggered problems of adverse selection and moral hazard. Thus 
access to credit for those willing to pay a competitive rate was hindered by the 
liquidity constraints and the low capitalization of the banking sector. At the same 
time, state-owned enterprises, correctly believing they were too important to fail, took 
bank loans for granted, often failing to repay them and expecting new bank loans to 
bail them out. 
Figure 1: Bank credits as a per cent of GDP 
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Source: Authors’ calculations from National Bank data (see National Bank of Belarus, 2000a, 2000b, 
2001, 2002, 2003). 
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 In summary, because the government assigned the central role in maintaining the 
Belarusian economic model to the banking system, it halted banking reforms and 
reinforced state control. Re-nationalisation of specialised banks, subordination of the 
NNB to the government, centralisation and state monopolisation made the banking 
system impotent and turned it into control tool. Moreover this occurred in a system 
with very shallow capital markets, where finance was solely bank-based. 
 
2.2 Financial restraints 
The key ideas behind Belarusian economic development in the late 1990s were as 
follows. 
 I. Disregarding the inflationary risk of money growth, the authorities stressed 
the importance of providing lax credit to finance increased output, as its decline, 
according to them, was solely attributable to enterprises’ shortage of money.  
 II. The NBB demanded high reserve requirements in order to target excess 
liquidity resulting from the expansionary monetary-credit policy. In turn, higher 
reserve requirements increased the government’s gains from seigniorage that flowed 
mainly from the expanding monetary base (Korosteleva 2007). 
 III Recognising the negative output effect of high real interest rates, the 
government favoured administratively controlled rates to make bank resources 
cheaper to enterprises. 
 IV. Seeing speculation as a driving force behind the BRB depreciation, the 
Belarusian authorities believed in their ability to ensure the BRB’s stability by setting 
the nominal exchange rate administratively and by restricting the access of non-
critical importers to the foreign exchange market. 
 These ideas led to the implementation of the four main financial repressionist 
policies that together formed the centre of the Belarusian strategy of economic 
development. These were: directed credits and preferential loans to key sectors; high 
reserve requirements; negative real interest rates; and multiple exchange rates. 
 
Directed credits 
Although directed credits were used continuously from the beginning of transition, 
they were first officially defined only in 1998. They were designated as loans 
designed mainly to support agriculture4 and house construction. They can be regarded 
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as quasi-budget expenses. This explains why Belarus had an unusually low budget 
deficit, for post-communist countries, of under 3 per cent of GDP. Traditionally, the 
loans were channelled through SF banks within open credit lines, at interest rates 
varying between one fiftieth and one half of the refinancing rate (see below).  
 The NBB resolution also envisaged the use of bank-agents or ‘system-
forming’ banks in financing other “high priority” governmental programs at 
‘favourable terms’5 at the expense of banks’ own or attracted capital. But because of 
banks` persistent liquidity problems, stemming from their financing of low-yield 
projects, the NBB had to bail them out. Therefore financing employing banks’ 
resources remained significantly inflationary; the only difference being that now their 
loans were subsequently financed by NBB emissions. There is evidence that many 
loans were continually rolled over, often without even adding the interest due from 
the longer loan.  
 Banks’ margins for directed credits or preferential loans were often set at 1-2 
per cent. So, the concept of margin was practically meaningless as 1) real lending 
rates were often negative and could not even cover banks’ borrowing costs. 2) Interest 
payments were only occasionally paid (house construction and industry), if at all 
(agriculture). 3) Outstanding loans were rarely recovered, and so were potential bad 
debts. The National Bank or the Ministry of Finance applied debt-for-equity swap 
schemes to these banks, so increasing their degree of their state ownership.   
 Financing of priority enterprises by commercial banks ‘on favourable terms’ 
surged, especially after 1999 when the authorities expressed their intention to increase 
the use of commercial banks’ resources to finance economic agents. In fact, official 
statistics suggest that, in 2000, directed credits to house construction and to 
agriculture were fully replaced with preferential credits issued by commercial banks. 
But this did little to change the essential problem, as inflationary financing was still in 
place. Therefore the table 1 figures on direct credits do not reflect the full extent of 
inflationary financing of the economy as they omit preferential loans6. 
According to the NBB all forms of refinancing, excluding directed credits, are 
defined as market forms of refinancing. But none of these credits were allocated on a 
true market basis, and interest rates were wholly administrative. 
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Table 1: Structure of banks’ refinancing 
Share of each form of refinancing in total volume 
of refinancing, % 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Directed credits 65.3 53.5 58.7 45.1 0 
including:      
                   house construction N/a 25.7 32.4 33.9 0 
                   agricultural sector N/a 27.2 23.4 9.3 0 
                   other    1.9  
Lombard credits 8.5 1 0 14.7 15.8 
Overnight credits     37.4 
Purchase of government securities (including ‘repo’ 
operations) 
12.8 14.6 28.4 22.9 18.7 
Swap transactions 13.4 29.9 11.3 15.1 5.3 
Other forms refinancing 0 1 1.6 2.2 22.8 
Total: 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: NBB material given to the authors by the Head of Foreign Exchange Analysis and Forecasting 
Division of the NB in March 2003.   
 
 
Alongside directed credits and preferential loans schemes, the NBB consistently 
monetised the budget deficit7. So it is worth comparing data on NBB credits to the 
government to the actual budget expenditures supporting priority sectors (agriculture, 
house construction and industry) to see to what extent the latter could potentially be 
covered by the NBB emission.  
In fact there was little conceptual difference between loans granted to the 
government to finance priority sectors and the NBB directed credits. The National 
Bank issued loans to the Ministry of Finance, which in turn reallocated them between 
the SF banks. Also from 1999 SF banks commonly financed ‘strategic’ enterprises at 
the actual refinancing rate, but were compensated by the government at only half of 
the refinancing rate due to be paid by ‘strategic’ enterprises. In fact, this 
compensation was meant to be paid from the Republic’s budget (from the item on 
‘Subsidies to state enterprises and organisations and other subsidies’). A similar 
contemporary state budget financing scheme, envisaged compensation of 50 per cent 
of the refinancing rate, for SF banks that issued loans to ‘strategic enterprises’ at half 
of the refinancing rate. Compensation was not commonly paid. 
 
 
 
 10
Table 2: Actual government expenditures, in part financing agriculture, house 
construction and industry 
 
 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Total expenditure, 
mln. BRB 
63345.7 135865.
3 
249577.
5 
1142843 3181146 
including: 
Agricultural sector 1996.0 4222.9 9799.0 37253.6 87050.9 
House construction 2489.0 6133.9 13107.3 81387.7 248081.6 
Industry 675.4 1730.4 3747.9 20409.9 34735.6 
Budget deficit/surplus -3645.9 -6738.5 -9995.5 -87935.7 -1747.3 
Total expenditures on the 
aforementioned budget 
articles, as % of total 
government expenditure 
 
8.1 
 
8.9 
 
10.7 
 
12.2 
 
11.6 
NBB financing of 
government deficit (plan) 
1860.00 3375.0 6075.3 28700 75875.9 
NBB financing of budget 
deficit (actual) 
7484 12437.9 48440.7 138682.7 261058 
Percentage change in 
government financing by 
NBB  
 66 289 186 88 
Total expenditures on the 
aforementioned budget 
articles, as % of NBB 
financing (actual) 
 
69 
 
97 
 
55 
 
100.3 
 
142 
Source: Authors’ calculations on the NBB data. Figures on NBB financing of the budget deficit were 
derived from the Law ‘On Budget of the Republic of Belarus for 1996’, No. 279-XIII (19 April 1996), 
the Law ‘On Budget of the Republic of Belarus for 1997’, No. 20-3 (21 February 1997); the Law ‘On 
Budget of the Republic of Belarus for 1998’, No.107-3 (29 December 1997); the Law ‘On Budget of 
the Republic of Belarus for 1999’, No.245-3 (24 February 1999); the Law ‘On Budget of the Republic 
of Belarus for 2000’, No.367-3 (31 January 2000) (Konsul’tant Plyus: Belarus [CD-Rom] 2002). 
 
Interest rates controls 
Belarusian credit policy has primarily been based on the policy of administratively 
controlled interest rates. But available official records of interest rate controls 
(especially lending and deposit rates) are very limited. The legal database holding 
most of the records on bank regulation contains some fragmentary information on the 
use of deposit rate floors, margin controls, and lending rate ceilings (primarily for 
directed credits). Lending interest rates ceilings on loans of commercial banks are 
only directly mentioned in ‘Main Monetary and Credit Guidelines of the Republic of 
Belarus for 1994’ and in Banking Code No.441-3 (25 October 2000). The former 
document states that ‘until the market mechanism of economic regulation is in place, 
the NBB has the right to carry out a policy of temporarily imposing lending rates 
ceilings both on directed credits and on the loans of commercial banks to the real 
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sector’. The second document adds: ‘In exceptional cases the NBB has the right to set 
minimum/maximum lending interest rates for commercial banks in their operations 
with individuals and legal entities’ (paragraph 52). In fact many instructions, 
including those regulating interest rates, came in the form of the written letters for the 
‘internal use’ of the NBB or in the form of NBB oral ‘recommendations’. Most of the 
information on interest rates ceilings, particularly on lending interest rates ceilings, is 
confidential (confirmed by the Head of Foreign Exchange Analysis and Forecasting 
Division of the NB in March 2003).  
 Following Roubini and Sala-i-Martin’s approach (1992), in the absence of 
reliable information on the actual controls, the level of real interest rates can be useful 
in evaluating the degree of the interest rate repression (figure 2). 
 
Figure 2: Real lending and deposit interest rates 
-20
-15
-10
-5
0
5
10
15
1995 Jan
Apr
Jul
Oct
1996 Jan
Apr
Jul
Oct
1997 Jan
Apr
Jul
Oct
1998 Jan
Apr
Jul
Oct
1999 Jan
Apr
Jul
Oct
2000 Jan
Apr
Jul
Lending rate (monthly average) Deposit rate (monthly average)
 
Source: Authors’ calculations on the data provided by the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus 
 
There is no documentary evidence on deposit interest rate ceilings. However, as in the 
case of lending interest rate ceilings, figure 2 speaks for itself. Moreover, as Fry 
argued, ‘in the absence of deposit rate ceilings, the FR tax may still be borne by 
depositors to the extent that banks are required to use their own resources to acquire 
non-reserve assets that yield net returns below the world market interest rate’ (Fry, 
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1995:6). Thus, by being obliged to issue loans at low or negative real interest rates or 
to invest in government bonds whose real yield was proxied by the real announced 
refinancing rate, commercial banks had little choice but to offer comparable returns 
on deposits. 
 In summary, interest rates never operated as an efficient instrument to allocate 
funds. Moreover, very high interest rates had an adverse selection effect on borrowers 
- encouraging investment with low returns (agriculture, house construction and state 
industrial enterprises) - and crowding out high-yielding private sector projects.  
 
Reserve requirements 
The policy of unprecedented monetary-credit expansion created excess liquidity in 
the market. Yet some of the SF banks (particularly Belarusbank and Agroprombank) 
were facing contracting liquidity, while others had it in excess. Thus the NBB 
resorted to the policy of higher reserve requirements to be able to regulate any such 
‘market’ imbalances.   
 De Melo and Denizer (1997) in their work on monetary policy during 
transition, use 12 per cent or less as a yardstick for maximum reserve requirements to 
classify economies as market-oriented.  In Belarus, while never exceeding 30 per cent 
and falling in recent years, reserve requirements were above 12 per cent for most of 
the period. The policy of high reserve requirements can still have a greater than 
expected negative effect on the financial sector. With high inflation, increasing 
reserve requirements has a magnified effect, expanding the wedge between deposit 
and lending rates (Fry, 1995:43). Thus, under de-facto controlled lending rates, 
deposit rates could potentially have been negligibly low. Hence the authorities’ 
decision was to impose deposit floors in 1996.   
 
Multiple exchange rates  
Exchange rate policy can be divided into three main periods: 1993-4, with a floating 
rate; 1995-6 with a fixed rate; and 1996-2000, with a ‘planned devaluation’ system. 
The latter relied on multiple exchange rates. Since the official exchange rate was on 
average 60 per cent lower than the market exchange rate, the obligation on exporters 
to surrender 30-40 per cent of earnings at the official exchange rate, in effect imposed 
an additional 15 per cent tax8.  
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 In 1999 the authorities began to move towards a uniform and stable exchange 
rate and current account convertibility. Indeed, at the end of 1999 the NBB freed the 
exchange rate applied by commercial banks for cash currency sale to individuals. By 
September 2000 the official exchange rate was devalued to the market level, which in 
turn was maintained by partial sterilisation of foreign exchange movements. Since the 
unification the exchange rate has remained relatively stable. 
 
2.3 Policy implications 
All four highlighted policies had a magnified negative effect on economic 
development. For example, the expansionary policy of directed credits and 
preferential loans, targeting, in the first place, ‘strategic’ (state) enterprises, resulted 
in high inflation and shallow financial depth. Although negative real interest rates 
boosted aggregate demand, an inability to stimulate domestic saving and therefore 
private fixed investment imposed constraints on its sustainability. Figure 3 shows the 
change in financial depth, narrowly defined as the ratio of total rouble denominated 
bank deposits to GDP.  
Figure 3: Financial depth, measured as a ratio of quarterly average rouble bank 
deposits to GDP nominal 
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Source: Authors’ calculations on the data provided by the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus 
(NBB, 2000a, 2000b, 2001, 2002, 2003). 
 
Figure 3 shows the ratio of total rouble deposits to GDP never exceeded 25 per cent, 
implying that, as a potential source of investment, domestic deposits played a fairly 
insignificant role in financing the economy. This is not surprising, as only 70 per cent 
of the economy was monetised.  
 As inflation led to devaluation the Belarusian rouble lost credibility, and 
dollarisation spread. With the ratio of foreign currency deposits to broad money 
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exceeding 30 per cent for most of the period, Belarus was a highly dollarised 
economy. So, the policy of multiple exchange rates was an instrument to hold down 
the price of foreign exchange. But this created the shortage of foreign currency in the 
official market that stimulated the development of the shadow market.  
 Moreover, excess demand for foreign currency prompted the authorities to 
impose foreign exchange and cross-border payments restrictions. The latter, and high 
inflation shrank enterprises’ nominal assets and induced them to use alternative 
financial mechanisms and barter operations. According to official data, non-monetary 
operations held a steady share of 30 per cent in total sales during 1997-2002. 
 But like the overall financial strategy, the consequent financial 
disintermediation is damaging in the long run.  
 
3. Evaluating the impact of financial restraints on financial development 
In order to examine the impact of FR on financial depth we estimate equation (1) 
replicating the model that Demetraides and Luintel (1997) use to examine the Indian 
case of FR, but allowing for its modification to take into account the specifics of the 
Belarusian economy: 
 LFD t = ttttto uDEVFRIRLYsa +++++ 4321 ααααα  (1) 
 where LFD is the log of financial depth, measured as the ratio of bank 
deposits to nominal GDP; and  
  LY is the log of real GDP per capita, seasonally adjusted; 
 R is the real deposit interest rate;  
 DEV is the rate of devaluation of domestic currency;  
 FRI is a summary measure of financial repression 
 The DEV variable proxies dollarisation. To construct this series it is necessary 
to recall the multiple exchange rate regime operating from 1996 to 2000. The nominal 
exchange rate is computed as a weighted average of official (15 per cent) and market 
end-of-month exchange rates (85 per cent) 9. With financial depth measured as total 
rouble deposits to nominal GDP, the coefficient on DEV is expected to be negative10.  
 As noted, the widespread use of barter and other non-monetary operations in 
transactions between economic agents was another consequence of FR policies. But it 
is impossible to address this problem due to the lack of information on barter 
transactions.  
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 Our empirical analysis has two objectives: first, to examine whether financial 
policy can be described as financial repression, and if so, to explore the effects on 
financial deepening. Second, to uncover the interactions between financial depth and 
economic growth through performing a Granger-causality test.  
 The initial hypothesis is that FR took place in Belarus in 1996-2000 and led to 
financial disintermediation with further implications for economic growth. So the 
coefficient on FRI in (1) is expected to be negative and significant11.  
 
3.1 Methodology and data 
The monthly data run from May 1995 to December 2002. The sample is chosen on 
the basis of data availability and the desire to incorporate both the 1996-2000 
repression and the fragments of partial financial liberalisation in 1995 and in 2001-02. 
 Financial depth is measured by the ratio of total bank deposits denominated in 
roubles, to nominal GDP. Data on 6-month rouble bank deposits, deposit and lending 
interest rates, official and market-determined parallel exchange rates were obtained 
from the National Bank of Belarus. Real deposit/lending rates are defined as nominal 
deposit/lending interest rates minus the current rate of inflation. The rate of inflation 
is defined as the percentage change in a consumer price index (CPI). Data on the 
monthly rate of inflation and monthly real GDP were provided by the Belarusian 
Research Centre of Institute of Management and Privatisation. The real GDP series 
was seasonally adjusted using an X-11.2 procedure. The real GDP per capita series is 
calculated by dividing the aggregate series by population. Financial depth and real 
GDP per capita are in logarithmic form.  
To avoid multicollinearity and a reduction in the degrees of freedom we use a 
summary index of FR (FRI) instead of introducing each repressionist policy 
individually (see Roubini and Sala-i-Martin 1992, Demetriades and Luintel 1996, 
1997). FRI is a simple arithmetic average of normalised policy variables. 
  The index is composed of series on four repressionist policies: (i) deposit rate 
ceiling; (ii) lending rate ceiling; (iii) directed credit schemes; (iv) reserve 
requirements.   
Because of the fragmentary nature of official data recording ceilings on 
deposit and lending interest rates, the first two controls are measured on the basis of 
Agarwala’s approach (1983).12 In the latter, the degree of interest rate repression is 
defined as being high when real interest rates were less than minus 5 per cent per 
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annum; medium between 0 and minus 5 per cent per annum; and low/absent when 
real interest rates were positive. Respectively, values 3, 2 and 1 are assigned to a 
dummy variable denoting FRI in Agarwala’s work. In Belarus the annual real interest 
rate sometimes exceeded minus 200 in 1995-2002. To capture the severity of interest 
rates repression, we use a different scale of values for the dummy variable. It is zero 
when interest rates are positive; one when they are between 0 and minus 20; two, 
between minus 21 and minus 40 and so on, up to a value of eleven when real interest 
rates exceed minus 200.  
The ‘directed and preferential credits’ repression instrument reflects the 
intensity of the program. The dummy variable is zero for no directed credit; and one, 
two and three when the share of directed and preferential loans reach 20 per cent, 21-
40 per cent, and over 40 per cent, respectively, of total bank credit (see Demetriades 
and Luintel 1997). As only annual data on the directed credit program are available, 
some subjective judgement was used to construct this variable. Monthly data were 
derived on the basis of annual data, taking into account the seasonal pattern of 
agricultural subsidies and the even annual distribution of house construction loans.13   
Finally, the required reserve ratio is a weighted average of the reserve 
requirements rate on demand and time deposits, with their shares in total deposits 
nominated in BRB as weights. Data on the required reserve ratio was provided by the 
NBB.     
The arithmetic average FR index was linearly transformed to take the value 
zero in May 1995 and to be scaled by 100. It is strongly positively correlated with 
each policy variable. 
 
3.2 Empirical results 
From the unit root analysis only the financial depth variable appears to be first 
differences stationary (see Appendix A). Therefore, after first differencing LFD, OLS 
is used. Other variables enter the equation in levels. In particular, an Autoregressive 
Distributed Lag (ADL) model is used to capture the dynamics14. The estimated 
coefficients of the explanatory variables are interpreted as their impact on financial 
deepening during the evaluation period. Unlike cointegration techniques, the ADL 
model will not allow us to draw any separate inferences about the short-run and long-
run effects that the explanatory variables exerted on financial deepening. The ADL 
model is specified as follows. 
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12 −+ tFRIδ ttttt uDUDEVDEVRR ++++++++ −− 98...... 1121121 γμμφφ                  (2)     
The expected rate of devaluation in the equation is proxied by the actual rate of 
devaluation15. 
The appropriate lag-length is chosen by the general-to-specific approach 
advocated by Hendry (1995). Given our monthly data we start with 12 lags and then 
use unit reductions to achieve the highest values of AIC and SBC (model selection 
criteria) consistent with white noise residuals. This results in the choice of an ARDL 
[(1, 12), 2, (1, 3) 1, 1] specification, where (1, 12) means that only the 1st and the 12th 
of LFD series are included in the equation, as they are the only ones that appear to 
be statistically significant. Their inclusion is required to overcome a problem of serial 
correlation in the residuals. The choice of the 1
Δ
st and the 3rd lags for the FRI series can 
be similarly explained.  
Before utilising the ADL estimator we tested all the series for weak 
exogeneity using a Hausman test. We ran an auxiliary regression with application to 
the real GDP series, financial repression index, the rate of devaluation and the real 
deposit interest rate of the kind of ADL model specified above (2). We introduced the 
first differences of the financial depth variable in equation (2), for the OLS estimates 
to be valid. The logarithms of the real government expenditures per capita and of the 
real industrial output per capita were used as instrumental variables for the real 
income series with the other variables treated as exogenous or predetermined. The 
current and the lagged values of the inflation series were used as instrumental 
variables for the real deposit interest rate, the devaluation rate and for the index of 
financial repression. The retrieved residuals from the estimated regression were 
included in the model of financial deepening (2). The coefficient of the variable 
denoting residuals from estimated equation (2) appears to be statistically insignificant 
for all the tested series16, implying that the OLS estimates are consistent and the real 
GDP per capita, the financial repression index, the real deposit interest rate and the 
rate of devaluation series are determined outside the system under analysis. 
The results of the ADL model estimation are presented in table 3.  
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Table 3: Summary of the results of estimating model (2) 
Explanatory variables Coefficients Diagnostic tests 
-14.09*** 0α  (intercept) (3.25) 
Serial Correlation: 
1α  (trend) -.009*** (.002) 
2χ (12)= 15.6 [.212] 
Functional Form: 
2α )( 1−Δ tLFD  -.138* 
(.079) 
2χ (1)= 2.36 [.124] 
Normality: 
3α )( 12−Δ tLFD  .478*** 
(.089) 
2χ (1)= 2.12 [.347] 
Heteroscedasticity: 
1β (LNYsa) .479 
(.255) 
2χ (1)= .014[.706] 
.677** ( ) 2β 1−tLNYsa
(.264) 
.735** ( ) 3β 2−tLNYsa
(.289) 
-.001*** 1δ  (FRI) 
(.000) 
.001***  2δ )( 1−tFRI
(.000) 
-.001***  3δ )( 3−tFRI
(.000) 
-.002*** 1φ  (R) 
(.000) 
.001**   2φ )( 1−tR
(.000) 
-.002 1μ  (DEV) 
(.002) 
.003   2μ )( 1−tDEV
(.001) 
-.123** 1γ (DU98) 
(.049) 
R-bar sq. 0.69 
Source: Authors’ calculations on data provided by the NBB. Standard errors are in round parentheses.  
 
The empirical performance of the model is satisfactory. It passes all diagnostic tests. 
All the coefficients with the exception of the rate of devaluation appear to be 
statistically significant. All but the real deposit interest rate variable in the current 
period have the expected signs. Theoretically, a real deposit interest rate should be 
positively correlated with financial deepening. Imposition of financial restraints 
should affect only the significance of this variable (reducing it), but not the direction 
of the relationship. However, the results above show that the real deposit interest rate 
at the current period in Belarus was negatively correlated with the current level of the 
financial depth. This may suggest that its repression was particularly severe. Indeed, 
even when the deposit interest rate was rising in real terms it still remained negative 
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for most of the analysed period and in this way could not gain households’ credibility 
to make them switch from investing in tangible assets and buying foreign currency 
(cash) to depositing their earnings in banks.17 Furthermore the FRI also exerts a direct 
negative impact on financial deepening that is independent of the influence of FR 
through the real deposit rate of interest, and it is statistically significant at the 1% 
level.  
The results suggest that financial repression had an overall negative impact on 
financial deepening. Financial disintermediation could have had negative implications 
for economic growth, if the financial development had mattered.  In the case of 
Belarus, it appears that finance did not matter for economic development in the period 
under analysis, although given the estimation technique we can only talk about the 
contemporaneous rather than long-run effect. A Granger-causality test suggests a one-
way relationship between the income series and the first differences of LFD18. The 
null hypothesis of the first differences of LFD not Granger causing LNYsa cannot be 
rejected at any levels of statistical significance (Fst. =.32, p-value= .96), whereas the 
null hypothesis of LNYsa not Granger causing the first differences of LFD can be 
rejected at the 10 % level of statistical significance (Fst. =1.83). Interestingly, while 
investigating whether various monetary-policy variables mattered for output and 
prices in CIS countries19 over the period of 1995-2003, Starr (2005) finds that a 
Granger- effect of broad money (M2) on real GDP per capita in Belarus is statistically 
significant at the 10% level. However, it should be noted here that the definition of 
M2 is broader than the definition of our financial depth series as it also includes 
foreign currency deposits. Furthermore, Starr (2005) extends the time span to 2003, 
the year by which some substantial progress has been made towards financial 
liberalisation in Belarus. Finally, the statistical significance, 10%, of the Granger-
causality effect of M2 is very marginal.  
The effect of financial development on economic growth materialises through 
two major channels: capital accumulation (extensive growth), and technological 
change (intensive growth). As FR resulted in financial disintermediation and 
demonetisation, growth can hardly be attributed to capital accumulation. Perhaps 
paradoxically, the policy of macroeconomic expansion triggered liquidity contraction 
and consequently an increase in arrears and barter transactions.  
There are two reasons why financial development could not raise growth 
through technological change. First, the state subsidies and banks’ loans were mainly 
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designed to support poorly performing state-owned enterprises in agriculture and 
industry to keep them afloat. Industrial policy was lacking ‘strategic coherence and 
selectivity’ and was unable to promote investment in specific sectors with strong 
growth potential and to ‘spur structural change towards rapid modernisation of the 
economy’ (Haiduk et al., 2004). As noted, the pattern of credit and subsidies 
allocation and a policy of low interest rates resulted in problems of adverse selection 
and moral hazard that were at the opposite extreme to that produced by the policy of 
high interest rates. The investment did not go to support the newly created private 
enterprises that were mainly serviced by non-system forming banks. In the risky and 
information-limited environment where the law often had a retroactive force and 
inactive bankruptcy procedures existed, the majority of the latter were reluctant to 
lend to the real sector, preferring to operate in the interbank loan or foreign exchange 
markets. Furthermore the economic mechanism envisaged not only direct but also 
implicit subsides to the state-owned enterprises in a form of tax exemptions for some 
state-owned firms. This was at the expense of increasing the tax burden on the private 
sector, and granting access to cheap natural resources, which together led to a 
crowding out of the private entrepreneur from the market.  
Second, due to the highly inflationary environment, mainly short-term loans 
were granted to finance enterprises’ working capital. The rate of capital depreciation 
fell from 6-8 per cent prior to 1991, to 1.5-2.4 per cent in 2002, suggesting that it 
would take 42-66 years instead of 12-16 years for full renewal of the fixed capital 
stock (Daneiko, 2003, p.125). Overall capital depreciation reached 60 per cent in 
2002 (ibid, p.125). Taken together this suggests that the average productivity of 
capital was expected to fall, due to the replacement of high-yielding investments that 
can be generated in the private sector or in the branches of the economy with high 
technological potential, by low-return investments, directed mainly to the loss-
making agricultural and industrial sectors, the inefficient house construction sector, 
and to stimulate household consumption through wage increases.  
Therefore, neither lowering the cost of capital nor directing credits and 
preferential loans to SOEs - the two core late 1990s FR policies - could facilitate 
efficient capital allocation and consequently sustainable long-run growth. In contrast, 
the policy of money-led stimulation of the economy triggered an inflationary spiral 
leading to demonetisation and unofficial dollarisation of the economy. According to 
an earlier study of inflationary tendencies in Belarus a one per cent increase in the 
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monthly inflation rate in Belarus during 1995-2002 on average led to a 7.8 per cent 
decrease in monthly real money balances (Korosteleva 2007).  
20The slowdown in growth in 1999-2002, growing inventories , an increase in 
loss-making enterprises21 and significant deterioration of Belarus’ competitive 
position22 all provide evidence of the inefficiency of the economic strategy. Belarus 
has neither attempted to create a competitive environment allowing new entrants into 
the market and opening itself up to FDI, nor has it used the opportunity of high 
growth to promote structural and institutional reforms.  
 
4. Conclusion  
 
The Belarusian experience of financial repression has had an overall negative effect 
on financial development, producing a shallow finance system and passive financial 
intermediaries. If finance had mattered in the long run, financial repression would 
have inhibited economic growth through decreasing the share of savings allocated to 
investment and reducing the average productivity of capital. Therefore the financial 
policy pursued in 1996-2000 can be viewed as a ‘survival-oriented strategy’ rather 
than a ‘growth-oriented strategy’ (Bakanova et al., 2003) that, in the first place, aimed 
to serve the government’s own needs in ensuring its political survival.  
Although since 2000 government policies have been gradually adjusted 
towards reducing economic distortions, particularly in the financial sector, and 
growth surged again from 4.5 per cent in 2002 to 11 per cent in 2004, the 
sustainability of the new growth pattern and therefore social stability remains 
questionable. This is due to the delay in economic restructuring and the economy`s 
vulnerability to changes in the external environment. Since 2001 improvements in the 
external environment largely explain these high rates of economic growth.23   
Therefore if the government continues to avoid fundamental reforms when growth is 
high24, it puts the country at greater risk of a severe transition crisis that will inflict 
even greater economic and social costs than after the Soviet Union’s collapse.  
 
Appendix A: Unit Root Test Analysis 
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To test our series for stationarity we begin by applying the Augmented Dickey-Fuller 
(ADF) tests. Regressions (A.1) and (A.2) were estimated to test for the presence of a 
unit root in level and in first differences of series, respectively: 
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Along with (A.1) and (A.2) two other regressions were estimated; the first 
with a linear trend not included in (A.1) and (A.2), and the second with both intercept 
and a linear trend again, not included in (A.1) and (A.2). The null hypothesis in the 
ADF is the presence of a unit root in the series. Table A.1 presents the summary of 
the ADF test for the presence of a unit root in levels. 
The results show that for the natural logarithm of real seasonally adjusted 
GDP per capita (LNYsa), for the real deposit interest rate (R) and for the rate of 
devaluation (DEV) it is possible to reject the null hypothesis of a unit root at the 1 % 
and 5 % levels of significance. This implies that these variables are I(0). The results 
of the ADF test for financial depth and for the index of financial repression cannot 
reject the null hypothesis of a unit root, and this implies that these variables are not 
stationary in levels. 
 
Table A.1: Results of ADF test for the presence of a unit root in level  
τ  Variable 
/Test 
statistic 
   2φ 1φβττ μτ αμτ ττ αττ 3φ     
  
 
 
Model Intercept & trend included in (A.1) A linear trend excluded 
from (A.1) 
Random 
walk 
0=γ 0=γ0=γHypothesis  0α 1α == 1αγ γ == 0 
given 
0=γ  
=0 
given 
0=γ  
=0 
=1α 0α 0α =   
0 
given 
 = 
γ= =0 
0α= =0 
0=γ
 
LFD          
.895 -1.161 .01 1.31 -2.02 1.99 1.98 -.42 (L=12) -1.01 
LNYsa* -5.87*** 5.88*** 5.66*** 15.47*** 11.54*** -1.61 1.62 1.32 .91 
(L=12th) 
FRI          
2.25 -1.79 1.61 1.71 -1.47 1.37 .93 -.53 (L=12) -1.20 
R (L=1) -2.89 -0.55 -0.9 .03 1.29 -2.91** -1.23 1.95 -2.63*** 
DEV (L=1) -3.04** 1.54 -.41 .09 1.44 -3.07** 2.05* 2.09 -2.25** 
Source: Authors’ calculations on the data provided by the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus 
(National Bank of Belarus 2000a (January), 2000b (January), 2001, 2002, 2003); Institute of 
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Privatisation and Management [online]; available from: http://ipm.by/index.pl?topicid=inside. *** = 
reject the null hypothesis at the 1 % level; ** = reject the null hypothesis at the 5 % level; * = reject the 
null hypothesis at the 10 % level. L in parentheses denotes a number of lagged differences.  
* Note: Since only the AR at lag 12 is significant, there is no need to include all the AR terms up to 12 
into the regression, but only the 12th lagged differences. 
 
Table A.2 summarises the results of the unit root test for LFD and FRI variables in 
first differences. The null hypothesis of a unit root can be rejected at the 1 % level of 
significance.  
 
Table A.2: Results of ADF test for the presence of a unit root in first differences 
τ  Variables 
/Test 
statistic 
2φ 1φττ αττ 3φβττ μτ αμτ        
 
Model Intercept & trend included in (A.2) A linear trend excluded 
from (A.2) 
Random 
walk 
0=γ0=γ 0=γHypothesis    0α 1α = 1αγ γ= 
0 
given 
0=γ
 
=0 
given 
0=γ  
=0 
== 1α 0α 0α=
0 
given 
= 
γ= =
0 
0α= =0 
0=γ
 
LFD -11.51*** -1.77 1.77 1.57 1.08 -11.23*** -.34 0.06 -11.3*** 
(L=11) 
FRI (L=1) -7.93*** .93 -.99 .49 .33 -7.88*** .12 .008 -7.92*** 
Source: Authors’ calculations on the data provided by the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus 
(National Bank of Belarus 2000a (January), 2000b (January), 2001, 2002, 2003); Institute of 
Privatisation and Management [online]; available from: http://ipm.by/index.pl?topicid=inside. *** = 
reject the null hypothesis at the 1 % level; ** = reject the null hypothesis at the 5 % level; * = reject the 
null hypothesis at the 10 % level. L in parentheses denotes a number of lagged differences.  
 
Diagnostic tests (see table A.3) performed to check whether the residuals are white 
noise highlight the problem of normality in R and DEV series. This suggests a 
structural change in the data that can be also traced by the graphic analysis of the 
data. Therefore, the conclusion of the absence of a unit root in these series can be 
biased. For the plausibility of the results we test all the series for a unit root, allowing 
for a structural change in them.  
Table A.3: Summary of diagnostic tests 
Variables 
/Diagnostic 
Tests  
Serial Normality Heteroscedasticity 
Correlation 
2χ [Pr] 
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LFD  2χ 2χ 2χ(2)= .972[.615] (1)= .353[.553] (12)=10.06 [.611] 
(L=11) 
I(1) 
LNYsa 
(L=12
2χ 2χ 2χ(2)= 2.78[.249] (1)= .408[.523] (12)=14.10[.294] th) 
I(0) 
FRI  2χ 2χ 2χ(2)= 2.43[.297] (1)= .752[.386] (12)=15.96 [.193] 
(L=1) 
I(1) 
R 2χ 2χ 2χ(12)= 13.93[.305] (2)= 134.49[.000] (1)= .029[.864] 
(L=1) 
I(0) 
DEV (L=1) 2χ 2χ 2χ(12)= 5.88[.922] (2)= 269.33[.000] (1)= 3.5[.061] 
I(0) 
Source: Authors’ calculations on the data provided by the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus 
(National Bank of Belarus 2000a (January), 2000b (January), 2001, 2002, 2003); Institute of 
Privatisation and Management [online]; available from: http://ipm.by/index.pl?topicid=inside. *** = 
reject the null hypothesis at the 1 % level; ** = reject the null hypothesis at the 5 % level; * = reject the 
null hypothesis at the 10 % level. L in parentheses denotes a number of lagged differences.  
 
Zivot and Andrews’ (1992) methodology is employed to perform a unit root test with 
the presence of a structural change. It allows us to treat the breakpoint as endogenous 
or unknown. Table A.4 presents the results of the Zivot-Andrews test. 
 
Table A.4: Results of Zivot-Andrews’ unit root test in the presence of a structural 
change  
Minimum t statistic/time of break  
Variables Shift in 
intercept 
Shift in trend Shift in both 
trend and intercept 
LFD -3.93 -3.93 -3.93 
(L=1) 1995:09 1995:09 1995:09 
 
LNYsa  (L=0) -8.15*** -7.66*** -8.16*** 
1997:06 1998:04 1997:06 
FRI -3.93 -5.1*** -6.002*** 
(L=1) 1995:09 1998:11 1998:09 
R -4.59 -4.78** -5.59*** 
(L=1) 2000:02 1998:11 1998:9 
DEV -4.07 -4.07 -4.92 
(L=1) 1998:08 1998:11 1998:08 
Critical values    
__________    
[1 %]    
 -5.34 -4.93 -5.57 
[5 %]    
-4.80 -4.42 -5.08 
Source: Authors’ calculations on the data provided by the National Bank of the Republic of Belarus 
(National Bank of Belarus 2000a (January), 2000b (January), 2001, 2002, 2003); Institute of 
Privatisation and Management [online]; available from: http://ipm.by/index.pl?topicid=inside. *** = 
reject the null hypothesis at the 1 % level; ** = reject the null hypothesis at the 5 % level; * = reject the 
null hypothesis at the 10 % level. L in parentheses denotes a number of lagged differences.  
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The results presented in table A.4 confirm that the natural logarithm of real GDP per 
capita appears to be I(0). Moreover, the real deposit interest rate could also be treated 
as an I(0) rather than I(1) variable, if we allow for a structural change in the data in 
both intercept and trend in the aftermath of the Russian financial crisis. The 
breakpoint picked up in the intercept of R in February 2000, for which the minimum 
t-statistic does not reject the null hypothesis of a unit root, can neither be explained 
rationally nor be supported graphically. As a result of the test, the rate of devaluation 
turned out to be I(1), whereas the ADF suggested it was stationary in levels. 
Similarly, the graphic examination of the series suggests it is I (0). But it should be 
noted that while the Zivot-Andrew test allows for only one exogenous break in a 
series, the graph suggests this series has more than two structural breaks in levels. 
Therefore, for our further analysis we will treat DEV series as I(0).  
The ADF results for FRI suggest an I(0) series. But the Zivot-Andrew test 
with a structural break at the date of the Russian financial crisisi rejects this. The 
results of a unit root test in the presence of a structural change for the LFD series are 
in line with the ADF results. Summarising the results of both the unit root tests we 
conclude that the LFD series appears to be stationary in first differences, while 
LNYsa, FRI, DEV and R are stationary in levels. Moreover Zivot-Andrews suggests 
a clear break in intercept/or trend/or both is present in at least three series. It occurred 
in the aftermath of the Russian financial crisis. The test results suggest the breakpoint 
occurs around September-December 1998. Therefore, the latter has to be incorporated 
into the model as a dummy variable to capture an impact of the Russian financial 
crisis on Belarusian25 financial depth. 
 
Notes: 
1. For an overview of empirical studies on financial repression see Fry (1995). 
2. The term ‘state monopolisation’ is used here to show that the banking sector is 
mainly represented by the six largely state-owned system-forming banks that have a 
dominant position in the market. More accurately each of these banks operates in its 
own segment of the market, without competition from the others. 
3. See IMF 1995:33. 
4. Most agricultural loans were to finance state grain reserves, the purchase and 
delivery of agricultural products, and sowing/harvesting campaigns. 
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5. The expression ‘on favourable terms’ means that the lending interest rate was 
only half of the refinancing rate. 
6. The lack of transparency in banking statistics prevents us collecting data on 
preferential loans. 
7. As a matter of fact monetisation of government debt has been banned in 
Russia since 1995, and in many CEECs from even earlier. 
8. 15 per cent = .40*.60/1.60 (Nuti, 1999, p.8). 
9. These proportions are based on the NBB approximate evaluation of the 
volume of transactions at each exchange rate. 
10. It would be also interesting to estimate an equation with financial depth 
measured as a ratio of deposits denominated in foreign currency to GDP. We would 
expect the real deposit interest rate on deposits denominated in foreign currency 
(FXC) and a devaluation of domestic currency to have positive effects on financial 
depth. But the lack of data on the deposit interest rate for FXC deposits prevents such 
an analysis. 
11. We also test for a non-monotonic relationship between FR and financial depth 
by entering FRI squared in (1). The latter turns out to be statistically insignificant. 
Complete model estimation results are available from the authors on request.  
12. As Roubini and Sala-i-Martin’s (1992) work suggests, the distortion dummy 
which is defined as dichotomous, taking the values zero when financial restraints are 
present or one when they are not, may fail to capture the severity of financial 
repression, producing statistically insignificant results. 
13. Both sectors were major recipients of directed credits.   
14. We also tried ARDL approach to conintegration or the 'bounds test', 
developed by Pesaran, Shin and Smith. This approach does not require us to know 
whether the variables are integrated of order I(1) or I(0) that perfectly served our 
needs, given that our dependent variable appears as I(1) and our explanatory variables 
emerge as I(0) variables. The ARDL procedure envisages two stages. The first stage 
involves checking for the existence of long-run relation between the variables, based 
on computing the F-statistic for testing the significance of the lagged levels of the 
variables in the error-correction form of the ARDL. The second stage includes 
estimating the long-run coefficients and the associated error-correction model. These 
results suggest that there exist more than one cointegrating relationship in the 
financial depth equation. A further application of the ARDL procedure is 
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inappropriate in estimating the financial depth equation, because the ARDL technique 
is based on estimating a single equation, while dealing with situations where there can 
be more than one level relationship, as in our case, is a matter of employing the VAR 
model. Following the unit root analysis all our explanatory variables emerge as I(0) 
variables that implies that our dependent variable  - financial depth which is I(1) - 
cannot form any cointegrating relationships with explanatory variables. With a view 
to employing the Johansen cointegration procedure, the inclusion of level stationary 
series in a cointegrated  space is visible following the arguments developed by 
Rahbek and Mosconi (1999), who contend that the inclusion of the accumulated 
stationary explanatory regressors in the error correction term will not affect the 
distribution of the test statistics. However, in the present circumstances it is not 
advisable, as the results can be spurious and hard to interpret, suggesting more than 
one cointegration relationship when, in fact, there exists only one true cointegration 
relationship. This is because the number of cointegrated relationships increases with 
every stationary variable included (this may be the same problem with ARDL 
approach to cointegration used initially). Moreover, the inclusion of a dummy 
variable to capture the impact of financial crisis in Russia would have affected the 
distribution of the test statistics, such that the critical values for these tests reported by 
software can lead to biased results. Finally, the Johansen cointegration procedure 
does not have good small samples properties; it tends to over-reject when the null 
hypothesis is true. Therefore, our only visible option here is to employ Autoregressive 
Distributed Lag (ADL) model by taking the first differences of the dependent variable 
to make it stationary and allowing other variables enter the equation in levels. 
15. In fact, hypothesizing the prevalence of rational expectations in the formation 
of the rate of devaluation of the national currency, we pre-estimated the model by 
using the Generalised Instrumental Variable Method, to account for a problem of 
measurement errors. Twice lagged values of the devaluation rate were used as 
instrumental variables. The results were unsatisfactory, with Sargan’s statistic 
indicating model misspecification.  
2χ
16. The p-values for the coefficients of residuals for LNYsa, FRI, DEV and R 
regressions are respectively .167, .515, .737 and .543 and therefore the null 
hypothesis of exogeneity cannot be rejected. Complete model estimation results are 
available from the authors on request.  
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17. Given high correlations between devaluation, real interest rates and the FR 
index, a negative sign on the coefficient for the real interest rate can be attributed to 
multicollinearity in the model. To check this we performed some sensitivity analysis 
to see whether the estimates are different when 1) the rate of devaluation is removed 
from the equation, and 2) when the deposit rate ceiling is removed in constructing the 
index of financial repression. The estimates were little different from those obtained 
by estimating equation (2). So both the sign and magnitude of the coefficient for the 
real interest rate were confirmed. This suggests that the negative coefficient for the 
real interest rate is more likely to reflect a poor instrument. 
18. To run a Granger-causality test we take first differences rather than levels of 
the financial depth series to obtain consistent OLS estimates (Toda and Yamamoto 
1995; Starr 2005).  
19. In her empirical study Starr (2005) focuses specifically on Russia, Ukraine, 
Kazakhstan and Belarus.  
20. By 2002 inventories had reached 65.3 per cent of current monthly output 
(Haiduk et al., 2004). 
21. By 2002 35 per cent of enterprises were loss-making, compared to 7.3 per 
cent in 1994. The share of profits plummeted from 52.9 per cent to 11.8 per cent of 
GDP, over the same period. 
22. Competitiveness is an important determinant of economic growth in small 
open economies. The erosion of Belarus’ competitive advantage can be explained by 
high wage growth attributed to nominal wage increases and real currency 
appreciation (World Bank, 2005).  
23. In 2001-2004 Belarus benefited directly from the growth in oil prices – 
directly by increased transit and refining earnings, and indirectly through increased 
Russian income raising demand for Belarusian exports. Russia remains Belarus’ main 
trade partner (World Bank, 2005).   
24. A high growth rate allows smoother transition reforms, but reduces the 
demand for them.  
25. While estimating the final model other breaks mentioned in the text were 
included in the regression to test their significance. None of them appears to be 
statistically significant in explaining financial depth. That is why we include only one 
dummy variable, denoting financial crisis in Russia, in a final regression.    
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